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ABSTRACT Data privacy in Internet of Things (IoT) applications remains a major concern of regulation
bodies. The introduction of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) enables users to
control how their data is accessed and processed, requiring consent from users before any data manipulation
is carried out on their (personal) data by smart devices or cloud-hosted services. Blockchains provide the
benefits of a distributed and immutable ledger recording digital transactions across a global network of
peer nodes. Blockchain support for tracking of operations carried out by an IoT-based system provides
greater confidence to a user that the IoT device is not infringing user privacy (as the Blockchain can
be audited to verify which operation was carried out, by which actor). A formal model (following the
privacy-by-design approach) is proposed for supporting GDPR compliance checking for smart devices. The
privacy requirements of such applications are related to GDPR obligations of device (and software systems)
operators (such as user consent, data protection, right to forget etc). Three smart contracts are proposed as
a practical solution to support automated verification of operations carried out by devices on user data, in
accordance with GDPR rules. We evaluate the performance and scalability costs of our approach using a
Blockchain test network.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain-based auditing, business processes, General Data Protection Regulation,
Internet of things, user privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rapid growth in the usage of Internet of Things (IoT)devices has led to the emergence of various IoT-based
applications in domains such as energy consumption and
utility monitoring, smart buildings, transportation, healthcare
and assisted living environments [1]. Smart devices can col-
lect many types of data about a user or their environment,
such as location, acceleration/ speed of movement, nearby
sound intensity – in addition to other information through
specialist apps hosted on the smart device (e.g. healthcare in-
formation or context information for customizing or optimiz-
ing service provision to a user). The collected data is (often)
transmitted to unknown third parties without the awareness
of users. For example, some IoT customers may set their
wearable devices in broadcast mode and when they are within
discoverable range, any other smart object can access their
personal data by sending unsafe requests. Understanding how
data protection can be supported by the IoT-based application
is becoming a significant concern. Moreover, data usage (in-
cluding storage duration and analysis) can become important
for sensitive data items, where personal data requires a higher
level of privacy and security. However, what is considered to
be sensitive is often subjective – but may include political/re-
ligious views of the user, user addresses, banking and health
information etc. In order to address this, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) has recently been extended
to also include IoT environments, to give users the right to
control their data and restrict how such data is shared and
processed [2], [3]. Some IoT applications also make use of
Blockchain-based techniques to incorporate user privacy and
security in the development of their applications [4], [5].
GDPR introduces a number of rules to support a user in
managing access to their own data. The basic elements of
GDPR are: a data subject, a data controller or joint controller,
and a data processor. The data subject has an identifier (e.g.
name and location), and the data controller is a person or
organization specifying operations/ processing activities on
personal data. The data joint controller is introduced where
there are two or more data controllers that jointly determine
the purpose of data processing. The data processor is respon-
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sible for analysing user data on behalf of a data controller
or joint controller [6]–[8]. GDPR associates responsibility
of any violation in data processing to data controllers or
joint controllers, but also gives a shared responsibility to
data processors when data subject has no control on the data
processing steps. The GDPR legislation proposes a number
of obligations (i.e. informed consent, data protection etc)
that must be followed by data processing actors with the
roles of data controllers or processors [3]. The importance
of verifying such GDPR obligations in IoT environment was
widely discussed in [9], [10]. Furthermore, the necessity of
accountability for data protection in IoT based on GDPR
legislation was discussed in [11].
Blockchain is a public ledger that involves a distributed
database and a set of connected nodes called miners [12].
It introduces “smart contracts" that can be deployed and
checked by everyone connected to a Blockchain network.
The contracts transform business rules to programmatic code
that can be automatically executed on a Blockchain. How-
ever, this conversion has limitations, as mapping rules that
encode legislation is often subject to interpretation and an
exact mapping is difficult. To overcome this limitation, we
only consider GDPR rules that relate to specific types of
operations that can be carried out on user data – e.g. read,
write, and transfer. In this way, for instance, any operation
that involves reading user data will trigger GDPR compliance
checking, i.e. seeking consent from the user of the IoT device
when a service requests this data. We acknowledge that a
more general consideration of GDPR compliance checking
is a challenge – and outside the scope of this work.
Both Blockchain and smart contracts have been deployed
in IoT devices to enhance transparency, trust and data privacy
analysis as reviewed in [13]–[15]. A privacy-preserving ap-
proach combining Blockchain, edge computing and IoT was
proposed in [16]. The use of a Blockchain in this approach
improves the privacy of data aggregated by IoT devices from
unauthorized third parties including miners.
Although the aforementioned approaches utilise either
GDPR legislation or Blockchains indendepently, none of
them proposed a combined approach to automatically verify
GDPR rules on data processing units. Existing approaches
also lack a formal representation for verifying GDPR com-
pliance for IoT devices at design time before accessing or
manipulating user data. An assisted living scenario is used
to show how the integration of GDPR and Blockchain can
appear as sub business processes for a number of IoT devices
that are part of this scenario. The key contributions of this
work are summarized below:
• a formal representation of business process models to
support verification of IoT devices based on GDPR
rules;
• specification of business processes to support data anal-
ysis from IoT devices (in the context of the proposed
scenario), and a formal description of the associated
privacy policies;
• verifying whether business processes (and their privacy
policies) are compliant with GDPR rules;
• implementing GDPR rule verification through multiple
smart contracts using a Blockchain network;
• performance and scalability analysis of smart contracts
to assess their execution costs and mining time in the
context of the proposed scenario.
This work primarily focuses on data privacy, particularly
on improving visibility of how smart devices use personal
user data. There is limited focus in this work on other as-
pects of security (or related threats). Security operations (e.g.
user authentication, encryption, etc) are primarily application
layer services that are used in the proposed model – however
the key focus is on data privacy and relationship to the GDPR
legislation (references to particular articles in the legislation
are provided to cross reference the mentioned electronically-
supported obligations reported in this work). The rest of
the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews related
work. Section III describes an assisted living smart building
scenario, the IoT devices involved, and the business pro-
cesses for processing data from devices within the building.
Section IV provides a formal representation for verifying
GDPR compliance of business process models in accordance
with multiple obligations identified in the GDPR legislation.
Section V describes the design and implementation of GDPR
rule verification through a Blockchain and smart contracts.
Section VI provides experimental results and Section VII
concludes the paper and identifies directions for future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Internet of Things research has made use of both Blockchain
and GDPR to enhance user privacy. Blockchain-based tech-
niques were used for improving user privacy, and a variety of
concerns were identified in [17]. The approach implemented
five privacy preservation methods: encryption, anonymiza-
tion, private contract, mixing, and differential privacy in IoT
ecosystems using Blockchains. In [18], the authors inves-
tigate how Blockchain infrastructure can assist in securing
deployment of updates for IoT objects. The technique enables
accountability of smart objects, supporting the audit trail
of changes that have been made to objects. An IoT-based
smart city architecture was designed in [19]. The architec-
ture made use of Blockchain to preserve the authenticity,
availability, integrity, non-repudiation and privacy issues as-
sociated with objects used in a smart city environment. A
Blockchain-based IoT forensics framework was presented
in [20] which maintains an interaction log generated by these
IoT devices in a transparent way. In [21], a Blockchain-
based trust framework was proposed whereby multiple smart
contracts were defined to enable IoT platforms to utilise
pre-defined interaction rules. A Blockchain-based method
that facilitates secure management of healthcare data in IoT
environment was introduced in [22]. Private key, public key
and smart contracts were used to improve user privacy and
provide an access control mechanism for digital medical
records. In [23], the authors presented a privacy-preserving
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Blockchain-based publish/subscribe model to protect data
privacy and interests of IoT subscribers. The model enabled
publishers to fully control any data access.
In [24], the authors proposed a framework for supporting
GDPR-compliant processing of user data generated using
IoT devices. The framework enabled data controllers to
inform users about the status of their personal data in a
transparent way. An IoT databox model was proposed in [25]
that provides accountability for IoT devices. The model
realized GDPR requirements focusing on how to promote
trust and user privacy. In [26], a GDPR controller for IoT
was proposed that enabled data owners to have full control
on how their personal data was used. Such control comprised
of tracking data flow between IoT devices and other systems,
and informing owners about accesses made to IoT devices for
user data. In [27], the authors presented an efficient method
to obtain user consent during collection of personal data from
IoT devices. The method was GDPR compliant in terms
of protection of personal data as well. A series of security
requirements and challenges imposed by e-health IoT were
analyzed in [28]. The authors designed an architecture for
supporting a GDPR-compliant mechanism for providing se-
cure e-health services to elderly individuals.
Although these contributions took advantages of either
GDPR or Blockchain technologies, there is limited evidence
of how these approaches can be used in a combined way. The
ability to track GDPR compliance in an automated manner
is also missing from existing efforts – as many existing
efforts require manual data analysis to be carried out to
perform compliance verification. Generating an audit trail
of interactions that take place on IoT devices, specifically
focusing on the use of GDPR rules, was presented [2] through
which several GDPR rules were translated as opcodes in
smart contracts to automatically protect IoT user data. In [3],
a Blockchain-based architecture together with business pro-
cesses were designed to show how the integration of GDPR
and Blockchain can appear as design patterns for IoT devices
to enhance user privacy. However, these solutions do not
formally examine the verification of GDPR rules on IoT
devices at design time prior to the use of any personal data
usage.
III. ASSISTED LIVING SMART BUILDING SCENARIO
Assisted living smart buildings are IoT-based systems where
building management data (e.g. energy usage) and user data
through wearable and user-proximity devices are combined.
Such environments can have several data operations (using
sensors, actuators, and devices) that are carried out on a user’s
personal data that require GDPR compliance. Such systems
involve embedded monitoring and control equipment with
the potential to observe users and their medical status through
bracelet sensing devices and smart monitoring objects that
can record heart rate, blood pressure, physical movement
and indoor location [30]. User data is then analysed either
locally or in a Cloud system, and based on the results
third parties can be informed to intervene for preventing
potential incidents for the monitored user(s) [31]. In such
systems, building and user data are integrated within a Build-
ing Management Control System (BMCS) and a range of
electronic actuators to achieve balance of building resource
consumption (e.g. energy for Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning (HVAC)) and comfort, and to determine the
medical/ physical status of users. Figure 1 illustrates the
business processes of a heart monitor, a motion detection
smart device, a blood pressure monitor, and a BMCS used
in a smart building.
Heart monitor—measures and displays the heart rate of a
user and stores it locally. If the rate is abnormal, the measured
data is sent to the BMCS for emergency actions.
Blood pressure monitor—measures the blood pressure of
user and keeps such measured data in its local storage. In case
of an abnormal condition, the data is transmitted to BMCS
and user is notified through a warning alarm.
Motion detection device—monitors a certain zone, senses
physical movements and transfers the location of monitored
user to BMCS. It alerts users If they enter a restricted area/
zone within a building.
Building management control system—interprets the mes-
sages or data received by aforementioned devices. In case of a
critical health condition, it calls an emergency service. Other-
wise a normal situation is displayed. It profiles or analyses the
status or behavior of users based on their medical information
or physical movements during a period of time – referred to
as profiled data. Moreover, such data is stored locally, and a
copy is sent to cloud storage to be accessible by authorized
physicians or other support agencies. BMCS also manages
access to connected devices to control their function, and
receives user data from these devices as required.
Using Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN)
in Fig. 1, four pools are used to illustrate different business
processes that can be carried out (manually or in an auto-
mated manner). Activities with dark envelopes denote send-
ing messages; and those marked with service icons in boxes
are automatically undertaken or processed by the system. The
green circle with dark envelope shows a receiving message,
and the box with a plus mark denotes a sub-process. The solid
arrows between activities denote their sequence in a design
pattern. Each activity may use or produce data recorded in
databases, demonstrated by dashed arrows. Finally, the par-
allel executions and conditions are represented by rhombus
notations with plus and cross marks, respectively.
The monitoring service and IoT devices used within the
assisted living scenario are managed by a system adminis-
trator. From a GDPR perspective, the building administrator
should determine the purposes of data processing and have
the role of data controller. The devices shown in Fig. 1
generate or transfer medical information and user location,
which are generally considered as personal data. The secure
protection of the former is an obligation in GDPR, since such
information is categorized as sensitive data. For instance, a
BMCS device installed in a building can analyze or store
such information and also give permission to other third
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FIGURE 1. Business processes of an assisted living smart building
parties (e.g. a remote BMCS or cloud provider) to access this
information. However, if the information is not encrypted,
operations on user data are not compliant with GDPR and
the data controller of the building is responsible.
IV. A GDPR COMPLIANT PROCESS COLLECTION
MODEL
As the GDPR regulation focuses on data processing on
personal user data, it requires system developers to show
such purpose in a more transparent way to a user. This can
be achieved by implementing a collection of design patterns
covering all activities undertaken on personal data during the
life cycle of a service. Business processes can explicitly show
the purpose of data processing carried out by actors such as
IoT devices [32]. A business process contains a number of
activities and relationships, identifying the types of personal
data being generated/ collected and where it is processed. For
instance, the blood pressure and heart rate information col-
lected by building management system is used for monitoring
the health condition of the user. We can therefore associate a
process with a purpose (e.g. heart monitor process/purpose
or motion detection process/purpose). Using such a business
process, a user is now aware of how their data is being
processed, and the particular device involved in undertaking
this processing.
In some cases, personal data may be generated or collected
from one process and be used in another. For example,
the location information collected and stored in the motion
detection process is used by the BMCS process. In fact, two
business processes interact with each other by exchanging
personal data between them. However, GDPR requires data
controller to receive consent of a user before the migration of
their data between business processes. To ease the analysis
of such GDPR regulations based on business process models,
the collections of business processes in a system can formally
be defined as follows (Appendix A provides a list of notation
used in these definitions).
Definition 1. A business process collection PS designed
for a system S is a tuple PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉, where
Act is a set of actors each of which handles a number of
processes; P is a set of processes; A = Aop ∪ Aop is a set
of activities such that Aop and Aop are the sets of processing
and non-processing activities on personal data, respectively.
The set D contains any data classes, including both relevant
and irrelevant data to user;Dh ⊆ Act×Aop×D×P is a data
handling relation set such that each relation determines what
data is handled by which process and processing activities
executed by an actor.
Processing activities in the definition refer to those that
directly use or process personal data. They cover a wide range
of operations executed on user data. The operations involve
the “collection, reading, recording, organisation, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, use, consulta-
tion, profiling, transfer, dissemination, combination, align-
ment, restriction, and erasure of personal data" (Art. 4(2)
of GDPR). For instance, the BMCS process involves a user
profile activity (classified as data processing) dealing with
user data for the purpose of medical analysis. Identifying
processing activities enables checking their compliance with
GDPR, since there are legal obligations associated with each
activity. Take for example the prohibition of profiling activi-
ties for underage users (Art. 22 of GDPR) or the prohibition
of storing data longer than its processing time (Art. 17 of
GDPR). According to GDPR regulations, it is the respon-
sibility of data controller to specify all processing activities
executed on personal data and to define a clear purpose for
each activity in advance. Section IV-A presents how purposes
of data processing can be explicitly defined to notify data
subjects (users) about the privacy policies associated with a
business process.
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Example 1. Assuming that act1, act2, act3, and act4
are smart objects (actors) handling heart monitor, blood pres-
sure monitor, motion detection, and building management
control processes, respectively. The process collection model
for the scenario in Section III using Def. 1 is as follows:
Act = {act1,act2,act3,act4}
P = {Heart monitor, Blood pressure monitor, Motion detection, BMCS}
Aop = {Read, Transfer, Profile, Store}
Aop = {Display status, Emergency call, Alarm, Monitor}
D = {Blood pressure(BP), Heart beat rate (HB),
User location (UL), Profiled data (PD)}
Dh = {· · · ; 〈act4, Read, {BP, HB, UL}, Building management control〉;
〈act4, Profile, {BP, HB, UL}, Building management control〉;
〈act4, Store, PD, Building management control〉;
〈act4, Transfer, PD, Cloud analysis〉; · · · }
We represented the setDh only for the building management
control (BMCS) process for simplification. A similar repre-
sentation can be used for the other processes. The “Read”
activity refers to the “Interpret message” in Fig. 1,
which is classified as a processing activity. The “Cloud
analysis” is the name of an external business process
receiving the profiled data of a user – initiated by the BMCS
process. Given the set of non-processing activities, the
“Alarm” implicitly refers to “Alarm abnormalities”
and “Alert user” activities in Fig. 1. Finally, both
“Monitor zone” and “Monitor devices” activities
are denoted by “Monitor”.
After specifying a process collection model (Def. 1), the
following steps are used for auditing GDPR-compliance [32]:
1) Implementation should conform to process collection.
Only the processes specified in the process collection
model should only be implemented.
2) Process collection should include a privacy policy, i.e.
a process should only collect or use data based on a
privacy policy.
3) Process collection should conform to GDPR regula-
tion. As an example, processes should receive user
consent before any access to personal data.
4) The privacy policy should conform to GDPR regu-
lation. For instance, a privacy policy cannot say that
personal data is to be used for unknown purposes.
A. GDPR-COMPLIANT PRIVACY POLICY
To comply with GDPR regulation, a privacy policy must
explicitly state the purpose for collecting personal data. For
instance, in the scenario presented in Section III, a GDPR-
based privacy policy can be expressed as “BMCS device
profiles user data for building management control”. The
following definition can be used to specify a privacy policy:
Definition 2. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be a process
collection and Dh ⊆ Act×Aop×D×P be a data handling
relation set. A privacy policy on Dh denoted by Pr(Dh) is a
set of statements: “acti executes α on d for p” for each
〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh, where acti ∈ Act, α ∈ Aop, d ∈ D,
and p ∈ P .
This definition states that a privacy policy can include a
number of statements, each of which must clearly define
the purpose of data processing. Informally, each statement
clarifies what processing activity is carried out, by which
actor, on what data classes, and for what purpose.
If an actor processes personal data without identifying a
specific purpose, it is classified as a violator in accordance
with Recital 50 of GDPR. Given Def. 2, if there is a handling
relation γ = 〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh such that pr(γ) = ∅, where
pr(γ) ∈ Pr(Dh), there is a breach based on GDPR.
Example 2. Let act1 be an actor handling heart monitor
process. Given Def. 2 and allowing meaning preserving
natural language transformations, the typical privacy policies
of heart monitor process will be:
“act1 executes read on heart beat rate (HB)
for heart monitor”,
“act1 executes store onHB for heart monitor”,
“act1 executes transfer onHB for
building management control”.
Since the heart beat rate is transferred to the BMCS device,
the purpose or process of the last privacy policy is building
management control.
B. VERIFICATION OF GDPR RULES ON PROCESS
COLLECTION MODEL
This section presents a formal verification for GDPR compli-
ance of four typical obligations, including user consent, data
minimisation, data protection, and data transfer. Such GDPR
obligations are verified with the aid of formal definitions
proposed for processes collection model and privacy policy.
1) Data Subject Consent
Users (data subjects) should give their consent for any activ-
ity executed by actors on their personal data (Recital (32),
(43) of GDPR). When data analysis purpose and privacy
policy of process collection is formally proposed (as in
Def. 2), the vote (i.e. a positive or negative consent) of a data
subject to a privacy policy can also be formally defined by
the following function.
Definition 3. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉, Dh ⊆ Act ×
Aop × D × P , and Pr(Dh) be the process collection in
system S, a handling relation set, and a set of privacy policies
over Dh, respectively. The vote of data subject j to Pr(Dh)
denoted by Γj is a boolean function:
Γj : Pr(Dh) 7→ {>,⊥}.
Let γ = 〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh be an instance of the handling
relation set. A consent has been given to pr(γ) ∈ Pr(Dh) by
data subject j if Γj(pr(γ)) = >.1
We can verify the process collection of a system in terms
of Recital (32), (43) of GDPR—legislated for data subject
consent—as follows.
1pr(γ) ∈ Pr(Dh) is a privacy policy exposed for γ.
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Definition 4. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be a process
collection of S and D′h ⊆ Dh be a processed data relation
set such that each relation determines what data was used
by which processes and what processing activities were exe-
cuted on this data by actors. With the assumptions identified
in Def. 3, the data controller violates GDPR requirements on
obtaining consent if there is an actor acti ∈ Act such that
∃ γ = 〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ D′h s.t. Γj(pr(γ)) = ⊥, or
∃ γ = 〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ D′h and pr(γ) = ∅.
Informally, this states that any data usage that has been
confirmed by a data controller must have an explicit privacy
policy, and require consent from a data subject; otherwise
the controller has committed a breach according to GDPR
regulations.
The processed data relation set D′h is not constructed at
design time. It can be formed after the online execution of
a process. For instance, to use such a set in practice, we
propose a smart contract – called submission – which makes
use of the D′h relationship via a Blockchain network. This is
realised during the run time data processing of an actor (see
Section V-A2).
2) Data Minimisation
GDPR enforces data controllers to limit (minimise) the col-
lection of personal data to only those data items which are
necessary for processing. In other words, data received from
a data subject must only be the items required for carrying
out processing (Art. 5(1)(c) of GDPR). Definition 2 led to the
generation of the purposes statements for business processes.
The following definition identifies data classes used by actors
for a collection of business processes:
Definition 5. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be business
processes within a system S. The used data set is denoted
by Du, where:
Du = {d ∈ D | 〈acti, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh}.
It states that d ∈ Du is used if at least one process handles
or utilizes it in accordance with Dh. Given this definition,
the compliance of a process collection model with the rule—
legislated for data minimisation—can be verified.
Definition 6. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be business
processes in system S, Dh ⊆ Act × Aop × D × P be the
set of data handling relation set, and Du ⊆ D be a set of
used data. Moreover, assuming that Dr ⊆ D is the set of
personal data received from data subject and injected to all
business processes in PS . The process collection model PS
is GDPR compliant with respect to data minimisation rule if:
Dr ⊆ Du.
This indicates that activities within business processes
should not receive or collect data which is not used for
processing. We can have Dr ⊂ Du for cases where personal
data is generated and used by business processes without
consent by data subject.
3) Data Protection
According to Art. 32(1)(a) of GDPR, data controllers and
processors should implement technical measures such as
encryption to ensure the protection of personal data prior
to or during its processing activities such as read, storage,
profiling or transfer.
Definition 7. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be business
processes in system S and Aop ⊆ A be the set of processing
activities. The encryption status of personal data handling by
actor act ∈ Act is a Boolean function:
Eact : D ×Aop × P 7→ {>,⊥}.
Let 〈act, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh be a handling relation. Given the
relation, actor act encrypted d ∈ D for activity α in process
p if: Eact(d, α, p) = >.
We can generalize this definition to check whether a pro-
cess collection model is compliant with the data protection
rule in GDPR (Art. 32(1)(a)).
Definition 8. Let PS = 〈Act, P,A, D,Dh〉 be business
processes in system S, act ∈ Act be an actor, and α ∈ Aop
be a processing activity executed on personal data d. The
process model PS satisfies the GDPR rule for data protection
if:
6 ∃ 〈act, α, d, p〉 ∈ Dh such that Eact(d, α, p) = ⊥.
This indicates that for every processing activity on per-
sonal data within a business process, the encryption of data
is required. Notably, one time encryption is adequate for
the same processing activity executed on the same data in
a business process.
4) Data Transfer
GDPR is primarily applicable for data controllers and pro-
cessors located in Europe. Data subjects have a risk of losing
the protection of their personal data when it is transferred
outside Europe. GDPR therefore restricts data transfers to
non-European jurisdictions, unless the protection of per-
sonal data is ensured through appropriate safeguards such
as pseudonymisation and encryption (Art. 44 of GDPR).
If data receiver does not guarantee the protection of data,
GDPR prohibits a data sender from transferring this data for
processing.
Definition 8 enables verification of actors in accordance
with data protection rule in GDPR. This verification can also
be used to check that data transfer will satisfy the rules in
Art. 44 of GDPR under which the encryption/ protection of
personal data must be ensured. This assumes that the location
of the actor can be identified, and the data senders and
receivers of personal data are recognizable in the business
process. A controller sending the personal data is classified
as a violator if its data receiver is outside Europe and the
verification of Def. 8 is not satisfied within the process p
handled by data receiver (act).
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3005509, IEEE Access
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
Example 3. Consider that in Fig. 1 the data processing
actor of heart, blood pressure, and motion detection monitors
are situated in a European country. These actors send their
measured or sensed data without notifying a user about a
remote BMCS (act4) server located outside Europe. Given
GDPR requirements, the satisfaction of the following is an
obligation before transfer of data by actors can take place.
Eact4 ({HB,BP,UL}, Read, Building management control) = > ∧
Eact4 ({HB,BP,UL}, Profile, Building management control) = > ∧
Eact4 (Profiled data, Store, Building management control) = > ∧
Eact4 (Profiled data, Transfer, Cloud analysis) = >.
The notations HB, BP, and UL refer to heart rate, blood
pressure and user location, respectively. The process cloud
analysis is an external business process interacting with the
remote BMCS. Such verification checks on encryption of any
relevant data to a user that should be provided by act4 during
the life cycle of the building management control process.2
V. GDPR COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION VIA SMART
CONTRACTS
After an electronic encoding of GDPR obligations, the auto-
matic verification of such obligations within an IoT environ-
ment is a main challenge. Furthermore, the implementation
of a privacy policy based on operations that have been agreed
by a data controller, in an easy to interpret manner for users,
remains another challenge. In order to address this, we make
use of a Blockchain network, to support the accountability of
operations carried out on smart objects in a secure, transpar-
ent and automatic way [2]. Moreover, the verification of the
aforementioned GDPR obligations over IoT devices along
with the privacy policies associated with the use of these
devices, can be implemented using smart contracts [33] –
executed over a Blockchain virtual machine. An architec-
ture that connects participants within IoT environment to a
Blockchain network, and implements three GDPR-supported
smart contracts for undertaking such verification is presented
in this section.
A. A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED MODEL
IoT devices can be heterogeneous in nature (using a variety of
different hardware configurations and firmware) and support
a number of different data formats. Many IoT devices – called
lightweight nodes – simply collect or transmit data [34]. In
contrast, some IoT devices – called full nodes – have com-
putational resources that enable processing of collected data
(e.g. single-board computers and smart phones). Some IoT-
based systems presently make use of container virtualization
for increasing the level of trust in services. Lightweight
containers can be hosted directly on the IoT device, and can
execute operations on device hardware. Containers therefore
decouple hardware resources from the supported software
environment. Their use has increased significantly in data
2The responsibility of checking GDPR compliance of data delivery to
cloud analysis is subsequently delegated to the data controller.
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FIGURE 2. Supporting user privacy using Blockchains
centers, and also recently in IoT gateways (often referred to
as “edge computing" systems) to monitor devices [35]. An
adaptive and modular IoT gateway – called AGILE – was
presented in [36]. The gateway hosts multi-containers and
micro-service based framework to provide device manage-
ment, data storage and access control. The use of trustable
containers in cloud and IoT-based ecosystems has led to
tracking of processing activities executed by services/ de-
vices on personal data. Such containers record the operations
carried out on data using a monitoring tool so that the log
generated by the tool cannot be altered [37]. Another similar
approach is the development of “intelligent hubs", essentially
gateway nodes that can interface with a number of IoT de-
vices available within a home or a factory environment [29].
The approaches proposed in [37]–[39] introduce a number
of approaches for realizing such a trustable container. The
container can be connected to a Blockchain virtual machine
(e.g. Ethereum) to store the activities of full nodes on user
data in a Blockchain. Storing such information can provide
a basis for the verification of smart devices. Lightweight
nodes have computation and storage limitations. Hence they
should be served by the full nodes to be monitored by a
container and can be indirectly registered in the Blockchain
network. For instance, the BMCS device depicted in Fig. 1
can involve a number of sensors – classified as lightweight
nodes. Such sensors should be accessed or controlled via a
user-friendly platform installed on the BMCS to be observed
by a trusted container (e.g. a trustable version of AGILE
container) hosted on a gateway.
A conceptual architecture for connecting participants
within an IoT ecosystem to a Blockchain network is illus-
trated in Fig 2. The architecture provides a reactive mecha-
nism for the accountability of data controller and the activi-
ties carried out by smart devices on user data. Such a mech-
anism allows devices to freely collect and process personal
data and verifies them at the end. It does not implement any
enforcement smart contract, which may impact (negatively)
on the performance of devices.
All parties in our model, namely data subject (IoT user),
verifier, data controller and devices have a unique identity
called the Blockchain wallet ID (e.g. Ethereum [43] account)
to be registered in the Blockchain. After registration, any of
these parties can access and use smart contracts implemented
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to protect user data based on GDPR rules. The data controller
manages an IoT-based system and requires personal user data
for analysis (e.g. the health data for a user over a particular
time frame) and determines the purpose of data processing.
Verifier is a third party interacting with the Blockchain virtual
machine to support the verification of a data controller.
The devices whose processing activities do not comply with
GDPR requirements can also be detected by the verifier. The
(trusted) container, which has also a Blockchain account,
locally stores the user data generated by smart devices or
received from an end user, and records any usage or access
to such data in the Blockchain. The conceptual architecture
identifies three smart contracts: privacy, submission, and ver-
ification contracts. Descriptions of these are provided below.
1) Privacy Contract
This contract identifies the purpose of data processing and
a user vote (i.e. whether a user has given consent) for such
purpose. The former is identified by the data controller and
the latter by a data subject. The implementation of this smart
contract conforms to Definitions 2 and 3 presented for pri-
vacy policy and user consent, respectively. As seen in Fig. 2,
the contract contains two functions: purposes and user
consent. The former gets actor address (e.g. Ethereum
account), the activity of an actor on user data, the personal
data classes that will be processed using the activity, and the
name of the process. Such inputs, which are associated with
the privacy policy expressed by Def. 2, are directly recorded
by data controller in a Blockchain – to be accessible by a data
subject. Providing data subject with such information meets
Art. 5 and Art. 30(1)(b) of GDPR enforcing data controllers
to explicitly define their purpose of data processing. The
user consent function receives a user vote based on
information already stored through purposes function in the
Blockchain and logs whether consent has been obtained (>)
or not (⊥).
2) Submission Contract
The contract is deployed by a container to store device’s
address, process name, executed activity (on user data), the
personal data that has been processed by the activity, and the
encryption status (Eact) of the activity in a Blockchain.3 The
contract has a log function to submit such information to
the Blockchain. The logged information can be used to verify
operations carried out by a smart device in accordance with
GDPR rules presented in Section IV-B. It is worth noting that
both processed data relation set D′h and used data set Du can
be formed in practice through this contract, as their related
information are stored in the Blockchain.
3) Verification Contract
This contract is deployed by the verifier to check GDPR
compliance of devices (actors) and data controller in accor-
3Recording such information through the contract complies with Def. 7
and also data transfer rules.
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FIGURE 3. Interactions within an assisted living smart building
dance with the rules expressed in Sections IV-A and IV-B.
The contract makes use of both privacy and submission
contracts to access data stored by them in the Blockchain.
The verify function in this smart contract checks:
• whether an actor conforms to the purpose of data pro-
cessing identified previously – according to Sect. IV-A.
• whether operations carried out by an actor on personal
data has received user consent – according to Def. 4.
• whether an actor only collected data needed for pro-
cessing (or if additional data was collected that was not
directly required) – according to Def. 6.
• whether the encryption of processing activities on user
data was supported or not? – according Def. 8.
Any violation is detected through the aforementioned veri-
fication and the data controller committing a breach of GDPR
rules is reported as violator.
B. ADAPTING SMART BUILDING WITH
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED MODEL
Participants in the assisted living scenario utilise a
Blockchain as illustrated in Fig. 3, which includes a gateway
for connecting and monitoring devices within a smart build-
ing. The gateway hosts a trusted container to track operations
carried out by these devices on user data and also provides
access to a Blockchain virtual machine (e.g. Ethereum) in
order to use and deploy our proposed smart contracts. The
administrator of such a gateway is a data controller in the
GDPR context. Before a user is given access to such smart
devices, the provider should register devices and their privacy
policies in a Blockchain (step 1). To achieve this, the provider
deploys the privacy contract and activates purpose function
to store a device address (e.g. motion detection address), its
processing activity (e.g. transfer), required/ generated data
(e.g. user location) and purpose (e.g. building management
control) in the Blockchain (step 2). A user can then connect
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to the gateway and query the registered devices (step 3).
Such a query is, however, subject to being given access to
the deployment address of the privacy contract that has been
shared by the provider. Using such an address, a user can
activate the user consent function to see the list of devices
and retrieve their privacy policies from the Blockchain and
give consent (step 4). Once the user has been connected to a
smart device through the gateway (step 5), the container starts
tracking activities (e.g. read, store and transfer) executed by
the device on user data (step 6). Meanwhile, it automatically
deploys the submission contract (step 7) and runs the log
function to send data items that are part of the processed
data relation set D′h (e.g. BMCS address (act), transfer
(α), profiled data (d), cloud analysis (p)) along with the
encryption status of the processing activity (Eact) into the
Blockchain (step 8). Finally, to check for GDPR compliance
of data controller and devices, the verifier can connect to the
gateway and deploy the verification contract at any time (step
9). It executes the verify function to retrieve the Blockchain
records and detect any GDPR violation (step 10).
C. TRUST AND SCALABILITY
Our Blockchain-based approach can make use of the authen-
tication technique proposed in [40] to enhance the trust of
IoT users and smart nodes. The technique uses Blockchain to
build virtual secure zones in IoT environments, where nodes
can trust each other. A zone (e.g. an assisted living smart
building) involves a collection of smart devices interacting
with each other to provide services to users. A provider of the
zone operates as the manager of a zone and can play the role
of a leader for registering identities (i.e. Blockchain wallet
IDs) of other nodes – called followers of the zone. Hence if
any node in a zone requests access to user data or queries
the processing purpose of another node, it must already be
registered by the leader. Moreover, each zone is equipped
with a verifier to check data stored in the Blockchain network
containing transactions of leader and followers on user data.
The verifier can use this transaction log to identify GDPR
violations.
In order to improve the overall scalability of our
Blockchain-based approach, we can utilise a number of
multi-Blockchain frameworks such as Cosmos [41] and
Polkadot [42]. Cosmos is a network for supporting dis-
tributed ledgers, including an independent network of par-
allel Blockchains – each of which keeps the transactions
carried out by a leader and followers on personal data in
a specific zone. The interaction between the networks is
realized through an inter-Blockchain communication proto-
col provided by the Cosmos framework. Such a protocol
enables the transfer of personal data and the communica-
tions of smart nodes in different zones. Polkadot supplies
the connection and communication of various Blockchain
networks through its key components, namely parachain and
relay-chain. Parachains can use a Blockchain for storing the
transactions of smart nodes in different zones. A Relay-chain
ensures coordination between the different Parachains.
For integration of our approach in the Polkadot framework,
the leaders of zones can also play the role of collators who
confirm transactions created from registered valid nodes prior
to sending them to validators, leading to the confirmation
(“sealing") of new blocks.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
An initial prototype of our Blockchain-based approach has
been implemented using the Ropsten [44] test network. Our
proposed smart contracts were implemented on Ethereum
using Solidity [45]. Ropsten is a public test network that
supports a number of miners and has a gas limit of 4712388
for contract deployment. Gas is a metric used to measure
the computational complexity of executing transactions [46].
Our proposed smart contracts were developed to minimise
gas consumption for each function or transaction. They were
tested using Remix – an online development environment
for Solidity running deployed contracts. The smart contracts
Privacy, Submission, and Verification were deployed in the
Ropsten test network. The amount of gas consumed for
deploying the contracts were 1088628 for Privacy, 598293
for Submission, and 951865 for Verification.
We consider the change in gas required by increasing the
number of actors (devices) and the average time taken for the
mining process. When a GDPR rule violation is detected, we
evaluate the relationship between user payment and violation
detection rate under different number of processing activities
in an assisted living smart building. This is undertaken to
investigate the budget a user should allocate to execute the
verifier smart contract. In some instances (depending on the
number of processing actors and operations involved), a user
may not have the budget to carry out such verification.
A. NUMBER OF ACTORS VS. GAS CONSUMPTION
This experiment involved changing the number of actors to
measure the amount of gas used for the execution of all func-
tions or transactions in the privacy, submission, and verifica-
tion contracts. We assume that the number of actors (BMCS
devices) in the assisted living smart building varies from 2
to 10, each of which runs four different processing activities
(i.e. read, store, profiling and transfer) on the personal data of
a monitored user.4 Moreover, the personal data items involve
blood pressure, heart beat rate, user location, and user ID.
In the experiment, for each activity, the number of processed
personal data was randomly selected between 1–4. The gas
price for running transactions was 5 gwei and our proposed
smart contracts were executed 10 times to calculate their
average gas consumption. Figures 4 and 5 shows the results
of the experiment. The gas cost for executing transactions
in both gwei and USD units were obtained.5 The gas price
4The reason of choosing BMCS device for the experiment was that it
covers all the aforementioned operations and deals with the designated
personal data items.
5https://ethgasstation.info/
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FIGURE 7. The relationship between the number of actors and mining time
unit is gwei, equivalent to 1 × 10−9 ether6 and the gas cost
is calculated as: used gas × gas price. By increasing the
number of actors, the transaction costs rise gradually. In our
implemented smart contracts, the privacy contract has the
highest complexity, and therefore the greatest cost to execute.
B. EVALUATION OF MINING TIME
Two different experiments are undertaken here: (i) the re-
lationship between contract deployment and mining time
under different gas prices; (ii) the relationship between the
number of actors (BMCS devices here) and the mining time
taking for their verification. We used Ropsten test network
to obtain the results of both experiments, since it provides
a measurement of the time taken from activation to mining
of a transaction. In the former experiment, we evaluated
the average mining time for deploying privacy, submission,
and verification smart contracts with various gas prices: 1,
5, and 10 gwei. The contracts were deployed ten times to
get the average time. Figure 6 shows the results of this
experiment – when the gas price increases, the mining time
decreases sharply. Given a fixed gas price, we observe a direct
6Ether is a cryptocurrency in Ethereum that allows smart contracts to be
executed.
relation between gas consumption (for contract deployment)
and mining time. Notably, this result can only be visible when
there is a big difference between the gas consumption of two
contracts. For instance, since the amount of gas consumed for
deploying submission contract was less than the other smart
contracts, its mining process took the shortest time.
In the latter experiment, the number of BMCS devices
(actors) varies from one to ten and each executes a process-
ing activity (e.g. read, store etc) on the personal data of a
monitored user in the smart building. Moreover, the number
of personal data items (i.e. user location, blood pressure,
heart beat rate, and user ID) being requested is varied ran-
domly from two to four. Our proposed smart contracts were
executed ten times to calculate the average mining time of
verify function, belonging to the verification contract. The
gas price was 1 gwei in the experiment. Figure 7 represents
the time taking in seconds for the verify function to be
successfully mined since its activation time. The results show
that the time depends on the interest of miners for mining
the verify function and does not depend on the number of
actors or the function parameters. Given a fixed gas price and
when there is limited difference between gas consumption
of transactions, it is found that miners can usually take an
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arbitrary time for the mining process.
C. VERIFICATION COST VS. VIOLATION DETECTION
This experiment involves changing the number of processing
activities, and measuring the cost of carrying out compliance
verification. We consider one actor (a single BMCS device)
and the number of processing activities (ops) executed by
the device on monitored user data varies between 5–9. The
number of personal data items required for each activity (i.e.
read, store etc) is randomly selected between 1–4. Moreover,
we assume that during each execution, a GDPR violation (as
outlined in Sect. IV-B) occurs. We used Ropsten for execut-
ing the contract transactions and the rate of gas price was
10 gwei. Figure 8 shows the results of this experiment. The
x-axis shows the fee paid by a monitored user for verifying
operations performed by an actor through the verification
contract. The y-axis indicates the number of successful de-
tected violations. Given a specific number of processing ac-
tivities and a cost paid for verifying the operations of an actor,
the verify function was activated ten times – indicating the
overall detection rate. The results show that when the number
of processing activities is five and a user pays $0.5 for
verification, the verify function is successfully activated even
if the processing activities deal with four personal data items.
As seen from the figure, there is a direct relationship between
the fee paid by the user and the number of violations detected.
Moreover, for a given price, as the number of processing
activities increases, the violation detection rate decreases.
For example, GDPR-compliance cannot be detected when the
number of processing activities is nine and our budget is $0.4.
This approach can therefore be used to determine the budget
to allocate to support compliance checking.
VII. CONCLUSION
We describe how GDPR obligations, including user consent,
data protection, data minimization, and data transfer can be
verified for processing units. Although primarily intended for
IoT devices, such verification can also be applied to other
service-based systems such as Cloud and Fog computing.
TABLE 1. Glossary
Notation Description
PS A business process collection
Act A set of actors
P A set of processes or purposes
A A set of activities
Aop A set of processing activities
Aop A set of non-processing activities
D A set of data
Dh A data handling relation set
D′h A processed data relation set
Pr(Dh) A privacy policy set on Dh
Γj Vote function activated by data subject j
Du A set of used personal data
Dr A set of received personal data
Eact Encryption status function activated by actor act
This paper extends formal models of GDPR compliance
verification proposed in [32] and [3], focusing specifically
on business processes. To carry out GDPR verification in IoT
environments, a Blockchain-based method with three smart
contracts is proposed. The smart contracts were deployed
in the Ropsten test network and our evaluation shows the
influence on verification cost as the number of smart objects
increases. For a given gas price (used to characterise exe-
cution of opcodes within a smart contract), we identify how
the mining time for executing transactions is arbitrary and
independent of the growth in the number of smart objects.
Our future work focuses on the implementation of our
Blockchain-based technique using an IoT testbed with a het-
erogeneous group of smart devices, to evaluate its scalability.
Furthermore, we will examine other GDPR obligations that
can be programmatically verified and propose their formal-
ism. The realization of the designed abstract model through
available Internet of Blockchains such as Polkadot or Cosmos
remains another challenge for future investigation.
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF USED NOTATIONS
Table 1 provides the brief descriptions of all notations or
symbols used in Section IV.
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